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Who's Footing the Bill for the Attorneys' Fees?:
An Examination of the Policy Underlying the Clean Water Act's
Citizen Suit Provision
Saint John's OrganicFarm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement District'
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress has recognized that effective enforcement of
environmental protection laws calls for citizen participation to enhance
governmental efforts.2 Accordingly, several federal statutes permit
citizens to bring lawsuits to enforce these laws. 3 However, litigation costs
may deter individual citizens or small businesses from bringing such an
' 574 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2009).
2James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10
WIDENER LAW REVIEW 1, 3-4 (2003). "Citizen resources are an important adjunct to

governmental action to assure that these laws are adequately enforced. In a time of
limited government resources, enforcement through court action prompted by citizen
suits is a valuable dimension of environmental law." Id. at 5-6 (quoting 136 CONG. REC.
S3,103 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (remarks of Sen. David Durenberger)); "The [citizen
suit] provision is directed at providing citizen enforcement when administrative
bureaucracies fail to act." Id. at 6 (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 33, 103 (1970) (remarks of
Sen. Muskie)); "Authorizing citizens to bring suits for violations of standards should
motivate governmental agencies charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and
abatement proceedings." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970)).
3
Id. at 2 (stating, "Environmental laws that allow citizen suits are, in more or less
temporal order: Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2006); Clean Water Act (CWA),
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006); Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006);
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA), 30 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006);
Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1)
(2006); Deepwater Port Act (DPA), 33 U.S.C. § 1515(a) (2006); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006); Energy Policy and Conservation
Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. § 6305(a) (2006); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act
(PIFUA), 42 U.S.C. § 8435(a) (2006); Ocean Thermal Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9124(a) (2006); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1)
(2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (2006); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),15
U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a)
(2006); Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. §
11046(a) (2006).").

WHO'S FOOTING THE BILL FOR THE ATTORNEYS' FEES?

action. In recognition of this hardship, many environmental statutes'
citizen suit provisions expressly allow the court to award attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party in the litigation.4 Most fee-shifting provisions contain
similar statutory language, requiring that attorneys' fees be awarded to
"prevailing or substantially prevailing parties" and only if such an award
is "appropriate." 5 While the fee-shifting provisions in citizen suit statutes
often contain identical language and have been interpreted similarly,
federal courts have grappled with determining exactly who qualifies as a
prevailing party and when awarding attorneys' fees is appropriate.
Unsurprisingly, the federal circuit courts are split in announcing a standard
for awarding attorneys' fees. While some interpretations give district
courts wide discretion in determining whether attorneys' fees will be
awarded, Saint John's OrganicFarm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement
District's interpretation of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision
gives trial courts limited discretion in disallowing an award of attorneys'
fees, thereby awarding attorneys' fees liberally.6 The Saint John's ruling
provides private litigants with the necessary assurance to proceed with
litigation in order to enforce compliance with environmental laws. Given
the circuit split and the recent interpretation of the Clean Water Act's
citizen suit provision in the Saint John 's case, a review of the policy
rationale underlying the citizen enforcement scheme is necessary to
understand the importance of awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing
parties in environmental litigation.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

The plaintiffs, Saint John's Organic Farm and Peter Dill
(collectively, "Dill"), brought a lawsuit against the Gem County Mosquito
Abatement District and Gem County (collectively, "Gem") under the

4 May, supra note 2, at 11.

s Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006).
6 Compare United States v. Comunidades Unidas Contra
La Contaminacion, 204 F.3d
275, 283 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that courts have "wide discretion" when considering the
appropriateness of any award of fees), with Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County
Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2009) (limiting the discretion
given district courts to deny attorneys' fees to the prevailing party).
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citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Gem's measures
for controlling mosquitoes in the county involved the longstanding use of
pesticides, whereupon the pesticides were sprayed from airplanes and fog
trucks. 8 Pursuant to the provisions in the CWA, 9 Dill sent Gem a notice of
intent to sue after Gem failed to obtain the required permit from
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for its discharge of pesticides
into the waters of the United States.1o After the notice of intent to sue,
Gem applied to EPA for the required permit to discharge the pesticides;
however, EPA responded that a permit was unnecessary pursuant to its'
interpretive guidance of the CWA." After EPA declined to issue the
requested permit, the parties participated in settlement discussions.12
Before the parties reached a settlement, Gem filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Dill and
EPA. Gem sought a declaratory judgment that it was either not required to
have a permit or that EPA was required to issue a permit.13 During this
time, Dill also filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Idaho alleging that Gem was violating the CWA br discharging
pesticides into waters of the United States without a permit. 4 The federal
district court in Idaho stayed the proceedings until the D.C. district court
reached a resolution.15 The D.C. district court dismissed the suit on two
grounds. First, the court held that there was no case or controversy
between Gem and EPA since they both agreed a permit was not required.
The court further held that venue was improper as to Gem and Dill.16
After the D.C. district court dismissal, the Idaho district court lifted its
stay and the parties eventually filed a settlement agreement.' 7

'Saint John's, 574 F.3d at 1057; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
Saint John's, 574 F.3d at 1057.

9 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).
oSaint John's, 574 F.3d at 1057.
Id.
12

id.

3Id.
14
d
15 Id.
16id.

1id.
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The settlement agreement required Gem to make efforts to reduce
its use of adulticides,18 to refrain from aerial spraying of pesticides except
in health emergencies, and to discontinue fogging pesticides from trucks
within certain footages of the Payette River and surrounding areas.1 9 The
agreement required that Dill engage in various methods of mosquito
control. Furthermore, the settlement agreement required Dill to release all
claims against Gem under the CWA, dismiss the suit with prejudice, and
refrain from suing Gem under the CWA so long as Gem complied with the
settlement agreement.2 0
The Idaho district court retained jurisdiction over the settlement
agreement to enforce its terms, specifically retaining jurisdiction to decide
the applications for attorneys' fees and costs under the CWA.21 Dill
applied to the Idaho district court for payment of its attorneys' fees and
expenses for both the Idaho case and the D.C. case, for a total sum
22
The district court rejected Dill's application
requesting over $149,000.
for attorneys' fees because Dill was not a "prevailing or substantially
The court
prevailing party," so an award was not "appropriate."23
examined Dill's alternative argument that Dill should recover fees under
the catalyst theory and held that the catalyst theory was inapplicable in the
context of the CWA. 24 Dill appealed the district court's denial of
18 Adulticides

are pesticides used to kill adult mosquitoes. Id.

19Id.

20

Id. at 1058.

Id., see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006).
Saint John's, 574 F.3d at 1058; Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County
Mosquito
Abatement Dist., No. CV-04-87-S-BLW, 2007 WL 2461990, at *1 (D. Idaho Aug. 27,
2007) (stating "Dill seeks $116,041.03 in attorney[s'] fees and $5,371.15 in expenses in
connection with the Idaho case and $27,549.05 in attomey[s'] fees and $89.16 in
expenses in connection with the D.C. case for a total sum of $149,050.39.").
23 Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement Dist., No. CV-04-87S-BLW, 2007 WL 2461990, at *8 (D. Idaho Aug. 27, 2007)).
24
Id. at *4. The alternative argument in Saint John's was premised under the catalyst
theory, which is where the plaintiff is deemed prevailing when the lawsuit was a catalyst
to a change in behavior underlying the lawsuit. Id. at *3 n.4 (citing Buckhannon Bd. and
Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001)).
This alternative argument, in effect, would have provided another interpretation for the
"prevailing party" status under the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision. A prior
Supreme Court decision has rejected the catalyst theory in qualifying a litigant as a
prevailing party. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc., 532 U.S. at 605. The Supreme
21

22
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attorneys' fees to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.25
The Ninth Circuit adopted a different test than the district court for
determining whether an applicant is a "prevailing or substantially
prevailing party," 26 and consequently held that Dill was in fact a
prevailing party under the CWA. The Ninth Circuit also articulated the
standard for determining whether an award is appropriate, as
appropriateness is a prerequisite to awarding fees under the CWA and the
court had not previously articulated a standard for lower courts to apply. 27
Given the Ninth Circuit's newly articulated appropriateness standard, the
matter was thus remanded to the district court in order to determine
whether an award to Dill was appropriate.2 8
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Section 505 of the CWA provides that in any final order in a
citizen suit a district court can award costs of litigation, including
reasonable attorneys' and expert witness fees, to any party if the court
determines that such an award is appropriate.29 However, to obtain
reimbursement of litigation costs, the party seeking such an award must be
a "prevailing or substantially prevailing party." 30 The authority to award
litigation costs rests solely with the district court, and the responsibility
cannot be shifted to the jury.31 Where a settlement is reached between the
parties, determining who prevailed or substantially prevailed can be
Court's standard for determining whether a litigant is a prevailing party ultimately
depends on whether there has been a "material alteration of the legal relationship
[between] the parties." Id. at 604.
25 Saint John's,574 F.3d at 1058.
26 The new application by the court for "prevailing party status" includes a
three-part test.
Id. at 1059. This includes: (1) whether the terms of the settlement agreement are
judicially enforceable; (2) whether there was a material alteration in the legal relationship
between the parties; and (3) whether the party received actual relief on the merits of the
claim. Id.
27
Id. at 1061.
28
Id. at 1063-64.
29 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006).
31

Jones v. City of St. Clair, 804 F.2d 478, 481-82 (8th Cir. 1986).

68

WHO'S FOOTING THE BILL FOR THE ATTORNEYS' FEES?

difficult. 32 Furthermore, there is a circuit split for determining the
appropriateness of awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party under
the CWA.3 3
A. PrevailingPartyStatus
Under statutory provisions authorizing attorneys' fees, the moving
parties must demonstrate that they prevailed in some measure. 34 Whether
the moving party is a prevailing or substantially prevailing party depends
on the circumstances involved. These issues have generated much
litigation and a number of Supreme Court opinions.
The line between naming a litigant a prevailing party or a losing
party has proven to be somewhat murky. Various decisions recognize this
ambiguity; however, the courts have not adequately clarified the status for
courts to apply. The Supreme Court's decision in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club35 interpreted the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, which states
that a "court may award costs of litigation whenever it determines that
such an award is appropriate." 36 Despite the absence of "prevailing party"
language in the Clean Air Act, the decision in Ruckelshaus read into the
statute the "prevailing party" standard. The issue before the Supreme
Court in Ruckelshaus was determining whether it was appropriate to
award attorneys' fees to a party that achieved no success on the merits of
its claims. 37 The Court noted that there is at least one consistent rule in the
See generally Saint John's, 574 F.3d 1054.
33 Id. at 1061. Compare United States v. Comunidades Unidas Contra La
Contaminacion, 204 F.3d 275, 283 (1st Cir. 2000) (giving district courts "wide
discretion" in determining appropriateness), and Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 885 F.2d
1276, 1229 (5th Cir. 1989) (requiring award when party has advanced the goals of the
statute invoked in the litigation), and Stoddard v. W. Carolina Reg'1 Sewer Auth., 784
F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1986) (awarding fees when plaintiffs have "served the public
interest"), with Penn. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228,
231 (3d Cir. 1998) (placing "no restriction on the award other than that the party entitled
to the award be prevailing or substantially prevailing"), and Atl. States Legal Found., Inc.
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1143 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that "good cause" is
needed for the court to deny an award of fees to a prevailing party).
34 Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1983).
s 463 U.S. 680.
36 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2006).
n Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682.
32
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fee-shifting provisions: complete failure on the merits will not justify
shifting fees from the losing party to the winning party. 38 The Supreme
Court held that some success on the merits is required before a party
becomes eligible for a fee award under the Clean Air Act citizen suit
provision; however, the Court failed to pronounce exactly what denotes
"some success on the merits." 39
In clarifying the "prevailing party" standard, the Supreme Court
case of Farrarv. Hobby4 o made clear how little relief is actually necessary
for a citizen to be deemed eligible for an award of attorneys' fees as a
prevailing party.4 ' In Farrar,the Court held that when a plaintiff wins
nominal damages, the plaintiff is deemed to be a prevailing party even
though the plaintiff sought substantial actual damages in their complaint.4 2
Thus, while the nature and quality of relief may have some bearing on the
amount of fees awarded, an extremely small amount of relief is sufficient
to confer prevailing party status.43 The Court further held that in order to
recover attorneys' fees as a prevailing party, the prevailing party must
obtain an enforceable judgment or comparable relief through a consent
decree or settlement against the other party.44 The Farrardecision set
forth the following standard for prevailing party status: "a plaintiff
prevails when actual relief on the merits of her or his claim materially
alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifyng the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." 5
The Buckhannon Board Care Home v. West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Services46 decision further articulated prevailing
party status in the context of the Fair Housing Act 4 7 and the Americans

" Id. at 684.

9Id. at 682.
40 506 U.S. 103
41
42

(1992).

Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 112.

43 Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054,

1059-60; see also Farrar,506 U.S. at 114.
SaintJohn's, 574 F.3d at 1059.
45 Farrar,506 U.S. at 111-12.
46 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
47 42 U.S.C. § 3616(c)(2) (2006).
4
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with Disabilities Act.48 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether
a party is "prevailing" if they achieve the desired result because the
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct and
the result was not through a court rendered judgment or court-ordered
consent decree. 49 This is known as the "catalyst theory" of recovery,
where the plaintiff is deemed prevailing when the lawsuit was a catalyst to
a change in behavior underlying the lawsuit. Many of the circuits
recognized the catalyst theory as a means of recovery under the citizen suit
provisions, but the circuits were split.50 Therefore, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Buckhannon case to resolve the disagreement
among the circuits regarding whether the catalyst theory was a permissible
basis for awarding fees. 5 ' The Court held that the catalyst theory was
This decision
inapplicable in a prevailing party determination.52
somewhat narrowed the potential avenues for awarding attorneys' fees.
Rejecting the catalyst theory, the Buckhannon standard for a litigant to
qualify as a prevailing party is if [the prevailing party] has obtained "a
court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant."53
The Eighth Circuit actually used the catalyst theory in decisions
prior to Buckhannon,54 but it began applying the Buckhannon decision to
the CWA citizen suit provision in Sierra Club v. City ofLittle Rock. 56 In
Sierra Club, the Eighth Circuit noted "the Supreme Court has made clear
that a plaintiff must receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim
before he can be said to prevail."5 The Eight Circuit then rejected the
catalyst theory, adding that the parties' voluntary change in their

42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006).
49 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600.
' 0 Id. at 601-02.
48

' Id. at 602.

52

id.

53

Id. at 604 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S.
782, 792 (1989)).
54 See Armstrong v. Asarco, 138 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1999).
ss 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
56 351 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2003).
5
7 Id. at 845 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603).
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relationship as a result of the lawsuit was insufficient to trigger a shift in
the general rule that parties pay their own fees.5 8
B. AppropriatenessStandard
Many of the environmental acts use the appropriateness standard
for awarding fees, including the Clean Air Act, 59 the Endangered Species
Act,6 o and the CWA.6 1 For example, the statutory language contained in
the CWA states, "[t]he court ...

may award costs of litigation . .. to any

prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines
such award is appropriate." 62 While the CWA mandates that the fee
award to the prevailing party must be appropriate, courts do not apply a
63
Some
uniform standard of application in making this determination.
courts stringently apply the "appropriateness" standard, using it as a safety
harbor provision that grants wide discretion to courts in discouraging
liberal fee awards. On the other hand, some courts use this standard as a
low threshold requirement before awarding fees.
The environmental acts containing a citizen suit provision have
been analogized to various civil rights statutes, and the standards for
applying fees have been modeled after the civil rights statutes.6
However, even with models for application of the citizen suit provision,
the "appropriateness" language used in the CWA citizen suit provision has
not been the subject of fluid application. 65
Citizen suit provisions awarding attorneys' fees is not a new
phenomena; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed prevailing parties that
brought actions under the citizen suit provision of the Civil Rights Act to
be awarded attorneys' fees: 66 The Supreme Court decision in Newman v.
58id.

5'42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006).
6042 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2006).
6 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)(2006).
62id

Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054,
1061 (9th Cir. 2009).
64Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 182 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
1999); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
65 See St. John's,574 F.3d at 1061-64.
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2006).
63
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Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,67 a Civil Rights Act of 1964 case,
announced the standard for determining when such fees should be
awarded and the underlying policy for awarding such fees. 68
The Supreme Court noted that a person bringing an action under
the citizen suit provision of the Civil Rights Act cannot recover damages,
but can only obtain an injunction to vindicate the policy that individuals
injured by racial discrimination seek judicial relief to secure compliance
with the law. 69 The Court reiterated the policy behind Congress enacting
the provision for awarding attorneys' fees, stating that "[if] successful
plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by
invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts." 70 The Piggie Park
case held that an individual who succeeds in obtaining an injunction under
the Civil Rights Act should ordinarily recover attorneys' fees unless
"special circumstances" would render such an award unjust.7 1 This
decision garnered widespread impact, with various decisions applying the
"special circumstances" standard in inter reting the "appropriateness"'
language contained in a variety of statutes.
Given PiggiePark's liberal standard for awarding attorneys' fees,
and the rise of citizens using fee-shifting provisions in environmental
litigation, it became necessary to analogize the interpretation of civil rights
statutes and environmental statutes. The Supreme Court accomplished
this in Pennsylvaniav. Delaware Valley Citizens' Councilfor Clean Air. 73
In Delaware Valley, the Court interpreted section 304(d) of the Clean Air
Act, which authorizes an award of attorneys' fees to a successful party.
The Court stated that the Clean Air Act and the Civil Rights Act have the
common goal of promoting citizen enforcement of important federal

67
68

390 U.S. 400 (1968).

Id. at 402-03.
69
Id. at 402.
0Id.

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,417 (1978) (regarding
Title VII);
Northcross v. Bd. Of Educ., 412 U.S. 427,428 (1973) (regarding Emergency School Aid
Act).
7 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
72
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policies, and thus should be interpreted in the same manner.74 Similarly,
the Endangered Species Act7 5 was given the same interpretation as the
Civil Rights Act attorneys' fee provision in the Ninth Circuit case of
MarbledMurrelet v. Babbitt.76
Although the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Air Act have
been analogized with the Civil Rights Act's standard for appropriateness,
the circuits are split on applying the appropriateness standard for a
prevailing plaintiff under the Clean Water Act.7 7 As the Supreme Court
decision of Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club highlighted, there is difficulty in
announcing a standard for appropriateness.7 8 The Ruckelshaus decision
stated, "[it] is difficult to draw any meaningful guidance from [an
attorneys' fees provision's] use of the word 'appropriate."' 79
The First Circuit advises that district courts maintain wide
discretion in determining the appropriateness of fees under the citizen suit
provision of the CWA. However, the First Circuit has not announced an
applicable standard for exercising such discretion.8 0 In granting this
discretion in the courts, the First Circuit referenced the Ruckelshaus
decision, which pointed out a Senate Report recognizing the court's
discretion in awarding costs.8 '
Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit rejects giving wide discretion to
district courts in determining the appropriateness of awarding attorneys'
fees.8 2 Limiting the district courts' discretion, a denial of fees and cost
under the CWA citizen suit provision must be shown with good cause in
the Eleventh Circuit.83

74

1d. at 560.

s 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2006).
76 182 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir.
1999).
Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054,
1061,1063 (9th Cir. 2009).
78Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983).
79
d
80 United States v. Comunidades Unidas Contra La Contaminacion,
204 F.3d 275, 283
(1st Cir. 2000).
81Comunidades, 204 F.3d at 283; Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 683.
82 Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1143 (11th
Cir.
7

1990).
83Id.
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As for the Third Circuit, the court in Pennsylvania Environmental
Defense Foundationv. Canon-McMillanSchool District simply noted that
the only consideration in determining the appropriateness of an award of
attorneys' fees was considering whether the party is "prevailing or
substantially prevailing." 84
Here, the court virtually read the
appropriateness standard out of the CWA statute.
Other circuits, including the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, rely almost
solely on whether the prevailing party's lawsuit promotes the CWA's
goals. The courts examine whether the prevailing party's action ensures
compliance with the CWA as a matter of public interest, which serves as
the basis for determining the appropriateness of the award of attorneys'

fees. 85
The implications of the different approaches used in the circuits
will lead to some circuits liberally awarding fees and some circuits being
conservative in their awarding of fees. By examining the various circuits'
application of the CWA citizen suit provision, one can see the turmoil
underlying a private citizen's decision to bring a citizen suit in securing
compliance with the environmental laws and the importance of
establishing a cohesive standard for courts to apply.
Given the
background of various environmental acts and the application of the
citizen suit provisions in these analogous contexts, establishing a cohesive
standard for courts to apply in CWA cases is a manageable task.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

Since the Idaho district court declined to award Dill attorneys'
fees, an appeal was taken to the Ninth Circuit. Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit had to interpret the language of the CWA in making its decision
whether Dill was to be awarded attorneys' fees.

Penn. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir.
1998).
85 Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 885 F.2d 1276, 1279 (5th Cir.
1989); Stoddard v. W.
8

Carolina Reg'1 Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1986).
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In deciding whether Dill was to receive attorneys' fees, the Ninth
Circuit divided the language of the CWA into a hybrid two-part test. 86
First, the court investigated whether the attorneys' fees applicant, Dill,
was a "prevailing or substantially prevailing party."87 Second, the court
examined whether an award of attorneys' fees was "appropriate."
In order to determine Dill's prevailing party status, the court
applied the standard set forth in one of its' prior decisions. 89 Using this
established precedent, the court examined the parties' settlement
agreement and applied a three-part test for determining whether Dill was a
prevailing party. The Ninth Circuit first looked to see if the terms of the
settlement agreement were judicially enforceable; second, whether the
settlement agreement brought about a material alteration in the legal
relationship between the parties; and finally, whether Dill received actual
relief on the merits of his claim. 9 ' The first two elements of the prevailing
party status were easily satisfied. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
agreement was judicially enforceable because the Idaho district court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and to decide
applications for attorneys' fees and costs.92 The court further determined
that Dill and Gem's legal relationship was materially altered because Gem
was legally required under the settlement agreement to behave in a certain
manner with respect to applying adulticides. 9 3
With respect to the third requirement for prevailing party status,
that the plaintiff must achieve actual relief on the merits of his claim, the
court determined that only a low threshold is necessary to constitute actual
relief. 94 Although Dill did not receive the exact relief requested, the court
decided that Dill effectively achieved relief through the settlement
agreement's terms by mandating Gem to engage in certain acts and refrain
Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d
1054,

86

1058 (9th Cir. 2009).

87id
88id
89

Richard S. v. Dep't of Dev. Servs. of Cal., 317 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003).
SaintJohn's, 574 F.3d at 1059.

90

91 Id.
92

d

93id
94

d
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from other acts.95 Because Dill was required to minimize adulticide
pollution under the settlement agreement, the court further concluded that
Dill achieved the CWA's goals. 96 All requirements being met, Dill was
termed a prevailing party by the court, as required by section 1365(d) of
the CWA."
As required by the citizen suit provision of the CWA, the court
next considered whether the award of attorneys' fee was appropriate.
Since the court had not previously applied the appropriateness standard for
awarding fees, the court took the opportunity to articulate the standard for
district courts to apply in these circumstances.99 Because there was no
uniform standard for determining appropriateness, the Ninth Circuit
looked at the various standards established by other circuits.' 00
The Ninth Circuit ultimately looked to a prior United States
Supreme Court decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,

which interpreted the civil rights citizen suit provision in order to
determine the appropriateness of fees. 01 The policy rationale argument
for awarding attorneys' fees in Piggie Park proved equally persuasive for
the Ninth Circuit in the CWA decision,1 02 as the court found that
promoting citizen suits to enforce federal policies generally serves the
public interest.103 The Ninth Circuit also justified their interpretation of
the CWA citizen suit provision on the basis of other environmental act
9 Id. at 1060.
9 Id. at
1061.
97id
98id.
99Id.

100 Id. at

1061-62.
Id at 1062. The Ninth Circuit looked at the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuit's varying standards for awarding attorneys' fees. Id. at 1061-62. The Ninth
Circuit ultimately decided to follow the Supreme Court's decision in Newman v. Piggie
ParkEnterprises,Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). Id. at 1062.
102 Saint John's, 574 F.3d at 1062. The PiggiePark Court stated, "If successful plaintiffs
were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in
a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal
courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees... to encourage
individuals injured... to seek judicial relief." Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390
U.S. 400,402 (1968).
103 Saint John's, 574 F.3d at 1062.
101
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decisions, such as the Clean Air Act and the Endangered Species Act,
analogizing the citizen suit provisions with the Civil Rights Act's citizen
suit provision.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's "special
circumstances" standard in interpreting the "appropriateness" language
contained within the CWA's citizen suit provision. Announcing the newly
adopted civil rights standard, the court held that the district court may
deny attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff under section 1365(d) of the
CWA only where there are "special circumstances." 0 5 Under the "special
circumstances" standard for determining the appropriateness of an
attorneys' fee award, the prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover
attornes' fees unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust. 06 The Ninth Circuit explained that the standard set forth provides
an extremely narrow means of denying attorneys' fees. 07 With these
limitations expressed, the court remanded the case to the district court and
ordered it to decide whether the attorneys' fee award was appropriate. 108
V. COMMENT

Many fee-shifting provisions in citizen suit statutes contain
identical language and have been interpreted using similar standards to
that in the instant case.109 These provisions allow attorneys' fees to be
granted to any party on a final order whenever appropriate."1 0 Federal
courts have grappled with determining exactly who qualifies as a
prevailing party and whether awarding attorneys' fees is appropriate. 1 1
Unsurprisingly, this lack of a precise standard for awarding attorneys' fees
'4Id. at 1063 (discussing both Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) (a Clean Air Act case) and Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 182
F.3d
1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (an Endangered Species Act case)).
105
1Id.
106 PiggiePark, 390 U.S. at 403.
107 Saint John's, 574 F.3d
at 1063-64.
1osId. at 1064.
'0 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 USC §
7604(d)(2006); Endangered Species Act, 42 USC § 1540(g)(4)(2006).
1o See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7604(d);
Endangered Species Act, 42 USC § 1540(g)(4).
.1 Saint John's, 574 F.3d at 1061.
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has led to a split among the federal circuit courts. 112 An examination of
the role of statutorily sanctioned citizen suits in society and further
illumination of the policy underlying the significance of such suits may
lead to a clearer understanding of why the Saint John 's interpretation of
the CWA citizen suit provision gave the court narrow discretion in
denying a fee award to a prevailing party.
Two countervailing views arise from the implications of the Saint
John 's holding. Saint John 's holding that attorneys' fees will be awarded
to a prevailing plaintiff in CWA citizen suits, absent special
circumstances,"' leaves some individuals with discomfort and some with
optimism. One view is that if successful plaintiffs are required to carry the
burden of paying for their attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be
in a position to advance the public interest and goals of environmental
statutes by bringing a lawsuit. 14 However, the opposing view posits that
defendants may be willing to "roll the dice" by going to trial on the chance
of success at avoiding the payment of an attorneys' fee award to the
prevailing party. This potential for risk-taking thereby discourages
settlement between the parties and further clogs the courts' limited
resources.1 15 In the pursuit of maintaining a safe and healthy environment,
environmental litigation is necessary. On the other hand, encouraging
settlements between parties helps to avoid the cost and uncertainty that
trials produce. Given the current difficult economy, parties es ecially
need to focus on negotiating a settlement to avoid litigation costs.' 6 With
the split among the federal circuits for interpreting the citizen suit
provision of the CWA, the examination of the underlying policy rationale
of the environmental statutes is necessary.
The citizen suit mechanism in environmental statutes is of
paramount importance. Given the citizen suit's role in environmental
litigation, attorneys' fees awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in these
litigations merit discussion. The rate of environmental citizen suit activity
112 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
I" Saint John's, 574 F.3d at 1062.
114 id

'Id. at 1064-65 (Tallman, J., concurring).
'16 Ruth D. Raisfeld, Negotiating Skills: Now More Important Than Ever, 32 THE NAT'L
L. JOURNAL 11 (Nov. 16, 2009).
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has accelerated markedly in the last quarter-century." 7 Citizen suits
promote economic and environmental interests, secure compliance by
countless agencies and polluting facilities, diminish pollution, and protect
hundreds of rare species and thousands of acres of ecologically important
land." 8 With the decline of government enforcement actions,"19 citizen
suits provide assurance that environmental laws are being adequately
enforced.120 Litigation costs may have a chilling effect on actions brought
by individual citizens or small businesses, particularly when a litigant's
personal stake is relatively small. The Eighth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Dico, Inc. highlights the large amount of attorneys' fees that
accrue in environmental litigation.' 2 1 There, the court awarded $370,454
to the prevailing party.122 If the plaintiffs do not have the ability to
recover attorneys' fees, it will hinder future environmental litigation that is
much too costly and technical for individual plaintiffs.
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that
private litigants were going to be a necessary and primary source for
securing broad compliance with the law.123 Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act's citizen suit provision,124 which allows the recovery of
attorneys' fees, to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination
to seek judicial relief. 125 Given the prior interpretations of the citizen suit
provision in Civil Rights Act cases1 26 and the liberal "special
circumstances" standard adopted in awarding attorneys' fees, the Saint
John's ruling is on target in adopting this standard for use in CWA cases.
With the decline of governmental enforcement actions and the importance
117 May, supra note 2, at 1.

"8 Id. at 3-4 (citing Adam Babich, Citizens Suits: The Teeth in PublicParticipation,25

ENvTL. L. REP. 10, 141 (1995)).
119 Michel Lee, Attorneys'Fees in Environmental Citizen Suits and the Economically
benefitted Plaintiff When are Attorneys' Fees and Costs Appropriate?, 26 PACE ENVTL.
L. REv. 495,499 (2009).
120 May, supra note 2, at 5.
121266 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2001).
122 Id. at 876.
123 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401
(1968).
124 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2006).
12sPiggiePark,390 U.S. at 402.
126
See id.; Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978) (discussing
Title VII).
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of environmental litigation under the CWA, private individuals should be
encouraged to bring suits to enforce environmental laws. We must rely
upon private litigants as a means of securing broad compliance with
environmental laws just as much as we relied upon private litigants to rid
the country of racial discrimination. Awarding attorneys' fees to private
litigants invoking the public interest is extremely important in both the
civil rights context and in the environmental context. Therefore, the
statutes should be interpreted consistently.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hardt v. Reliance
StandardLife Insurance Co.1 27 addressed the issue of whether prevailing
party status is necessary for an award of attorneys' fees under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 502(g).1 28 Since
the text of ERISA did not include the express "prevailing party" language,
the Court concluded that the attorneys' fee claimant need not be a
"prevailing party" to be eligible for an award of attorneys' fees.129 The
Court held that under ERISA's general fee-shifting statute, district courts
have discretion to award attorneys' fees to either party, as long as the fees
claimant shows "some degree of success of the merits." 3 0 Hardt evinces
that valuable judicial resources are being depleted in an effort to clarify
standards for the various fee-shifting statutes. As the concurring opinion
in Saint John's noted, "Congress is, of course, always free to clarify when
attorneys' fees may appropriately be assessed in these types of cases."'31
The potential of recovering attorneys' fees may make the
difference between initiating a citizen suit and simply standing by and
waiting for EPA enforcement.132 The Saint John 's ruling may result in
future courts relying heavily on the "special circumstances" language,' 33
thereby increasing payouts to individual plaintiffs and encouraging citizen
suits to enforce environmental statutes. Balancing the countervailing
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 F. App'x 332 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 130
S. Ct. 2149 (2010).
28
1 Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2156; 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2006).
29
Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2156.
0
13 d. at 2158.
131 Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054,
1065 (9th Cir. 2009) (Tallman, J., concurring).
132 Lee, supra note 119,
at 515.
133Saint John's, 574 F.3d at 1062 (majority
opinion).
127
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effects of the Saint John 's holding, one thing is clear: private individuals
are encouraged to use the citizen suit provisions of environmental acts
when they are given the assurance that their high litigation costs are likely
to be reimbursed by the other side.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Saint John's ruling provides substantial leverage to citizens in
enforcing environmental statutes. The uncertainty from a circuit split
regarding application of the CWA citizen suit provision for awarding
attorneys' fees necessitates an examination of the underlying policy of the
statute. In this instance, environmental statutes such as the CWA
generally encourage citizen enforcement of the statutes to serve the
public's interest. The "special circumstances" standard adopted by the
Saint John 's ruling provides limited trial court discretion in disallowing an
award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. Given the public interest
in maintaining a healthy environment and ensuring compliance with
federal statutes, liberally awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing parties
incentivizes citizen suits and environmental litigation. In the future, there
may be heavy reliance on the Saint John 's decision as a measure for
assuring that the prevailing party will not have to "foot the bill" for
attorneys' fees.
MARY CILE GLOVER-ROGERS
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